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How to Achieve the Physicalist Dream: Identity or Grounding?* 
 
 
Adam Pautz 
Brown 
 
Imagine [a picture] with a million tiny pixels. The picture and the properties reduce to 
the arrangement of light and dark pixels. The supervenience of mind and all else upon 
the arrangement of atoms in the void — or whatever replaces atoms in the void in true 
physics — is another case of reduction. 
 
David Lewis (1995) 
 
 
The reader is welcome to label ground physicalism a form of “dualism” or “emer-
gentism” (or perhaps a new position entirely), so long as she recognizes that ground 
physicalism is built around the thesis that the mental is not fundamental but rather 
grounded in the physical. 
 
Jonathan Schaffer (2020) 
 
 
 
Most of nature is pretty is boring: just different arrangements of atoms in the void. But 
consciousness seems special. When brains reached a certain complexity, a miracle hap-
pened. There appeared properties of a wholly novel type: conscious experiences. To explain 
this, we may have no choice but to posit special “psychophysical laws”. There are possi-
ble worlds where these laws don’t obtain, the miracle doesn’t happen, and we are all 
zombies. This is property dualism.  
In “Sensations and Brain Processes”, J. C. Smart articulated just how unappealing 
property dualism is. It provides a complex and nonuniform picture of reality. And he 
put forward an alternative physicalist dream picture of reality. In sentient as well as in-
sentient nature, “there is nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements 
of physical constituents” (1959: 142). All of nature is pretty boring. We no more need 
special laws to explain consciousness than we need special laws to explain digestion.   
Smart apparently favored identity physicalism. Roughly, everything reduces to phys-
ical and topic-neutral elements. Other proponents include David Lewis, Cian Dorr and 
Ted Sider. 
However, most physicalists today favor nonidentity physicalism. For example, Mark 
Johnston, John Campbell, and Jonathan Schaffer have defended versions of this view. 
Roughly, this view agrees with property dualism that conscious states are not identical 
with any physical-functional states. But, while dualists hold that conscious states and 
physical-functional states are connected by way of contingent nomic laws, nonidentity 
physicalists hold that they are connected by way of metaphysically necessary “grounding 
laws”. So they differ on the possibility of zombies.  
In this essay, I will argue for three claims.1   
                                               
* For comments and discussion, I am really grateful to Jonathan Schaffer, Brian Cutter . . . This 
is a (very) rough draft. Thoughts welcome! adam.pautz@gmail.com. 
 
1 I have briefly argued for these three claims elsewhere (2004, 2010, 2015). 
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First, Smart was right that there is a strong argument for identity physicalism over 
dualism. It does achieve the physicalist dream of a maximally simple and uniform view 
of reality. However, there are also strong arguments against identity physicalism con-
cerning the special nature of conscious experiences.  
Second, although nonidentity physicalism is a possible fallback position, there is no 
reason to prefer to property dualism. It provides an equally complex and unattractive 
pictures of nature.  
Third, assuming identity physicalism fails, we also should not much care about which 
of these options is right. In fact, it becomes different to understand the difference.  
In §1 I briefly go over the problems with dualism. In §2 I introduce identity physi-
calism and show it is better than dualism when it comes to simplicity, uniformity, and 
mental causation. In §3, I introduce the fallback position nonidentity of physicalism. In 
§§4-7, I argue that it is no better than dualism in these respects and in fact it is hard to 
understand the difference.  
 
1. The Dualist Nightmare: A Complex and Non-Uniform Picture of Reality 
 
1.1 Galilean dualism 
I accept Galilean intentionalism about sensory consciousness. So, in order to illustrate 
dualism, I will work with this view.  
To illustrate Galilean intentionalism, suppose you view a tomato on a table. Your 
experience is fully internally dependent. Even if you were an accidental, life-long brain 
in a void, you would have the same experience. But, as a matter of phenomenology, it is 
also essentially externally directed. In having the experience, you are conscious of a state 
of affairs in which there is a reddish and round item in space. So the brain has a myste-
rious capacity to enable you to be conscious of the quality red and the shape round, even 
if those properties don’t occur in the brain or indeed anywhere at all (as in the brain-in-
the-void case). Finally, this view holds with Galileo that “tastes, odors, colors, etc., only 
exist in consciousness”. The physical world is just atoms in the void; it is radically dif-
ferent from the way it appears. For instance, the red quality you experience is not a 
reflectance property instantiated by the physical tomato. It is not in the physical world 
at all. It is also not a neural property instantiated in your brain (no more than the shape 
round is). And it is not a property instantiated by a round sense datum generated by your 
brain in a private mental space – there exists no such item, there merely seems to be one. 
The quality red only lives in the intentional content of your experience.  
How did our brains manage to enable us to be conscious of Galilean qualities that 
occur nowhere in nature? On a dualist version of Galilean intentionalism, we must just 
accept with “natural piety” a slew of contingent, fundamental psychophysical laws link-
ing our brain states with our being conscious of Galilean qualities and shapes. Here is 
how Jerry Fodor puts it:  
 
Maybe the hard problem [of consciousness] shows that not all basic laws are 
laws of physics. Maybe it shows that some of them are laws of emergence. 
[Maybe] all the big things are made out of small things, and there are laws about 
the small things and there are laws about the big things, but some laws of the 
second kind don’t derive from any laws of the first kind. In that world, it might 
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be a basic law that when you put the right sorts of neurons together in the right 
sorts of way, you get a subject of consciousness. (Fodor 2007: 10) 
 
1.2 Problems for property dualism 
In “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Smart brings out three problems with any such 
dualist theory. 
First, Smart notes that dualism is complex. It requires novel macro-level natural 
kinds. It also “involves a large number of irreducible psychophysical laws”. So it goes 
against “Occam’s Razor” (1959: 142, 156). He also notes that they are unlike other fun-
damental contingent laws nature (the physical laws) as they relate very unnatural states of 
the brain to natural experiential properties. And there are worries about whether they 
could be systematized (Adams 1987).   
Second, Smart notes that dualism requires nonuniform account of nature. In the be-
ginning, there was a big bang. For eons, before brains of a certain complexity evolved, 
“there is nothing in the world but increasingly complex arrangements of physical con-
stituents” (1959: 142). Dualists agree with this; they accept “identity physicalism” for all 
of insentient reality (or so I shall assume). But dualists hold that, when complex brains 
evolved, irreducible conscious properties started “popping up”. And they popped up no-
where else. Smart objected: “that everything should be explicable [reducible] in terms 
of physics except the occurrence of sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable” 
(1959: 142). It goes against our belief in the uniformity of nature, a believe that we may 
be a priori entitled to hold.  
Third, Smart also notes that that, given causal closure (and setting aside systematic 
overdetermination), dualism requires epiphenomenalism, which is objectionable.  
I want to add to the problem of nonuniformity. The problem is not only that, on 
dualism, properties pop up that are different from other macro properties (geological 
properties, biological properties) in being irreducible. They are different from other 
macro properties in other ways.  
 First, on many forms of dualism, there is a big difference in the metaphysical struc-
ture of conscious experiences and the physical-functional properties they depend on. 
For instance, on Galilean intentionalism, conscious experiences are relations to unin-
stantiated edenic qualities. But the brain states on which they depend do not have this 
structure. In fact, no other macro properties in nature are like this.  
Second, normativity. Dualists will probably say that it is in the “constitutive es-
sences” (Fine 1994) of conscious to ground normative and epistemic reasons. Pains es-
sentially ground reasons to avoid, pleasures essentially ground reasons to seek. Experi-
ences also ground reasons for beliefs. It is in the nature of having a tomato-like experi-
ence to give you a reason to believe you are having that experience and that a round 
thing is there. It also gives you knowledge of what red is like. Maybe simply being capa-
ble of consciousness in general has intrinsic value. Indeed, perhaps conscious experience 
is the sole source of value in the world.  
This makes conscious properties very different from other macro properties in na-
ture. Other macro properties in nature independent of conscious experience (chemical 
properties, geological properties, etc.) do not essentially ground normative reasons. 
Even the neural properties underlying our experiences, for instance undergoing C-fiber 
stimulation, do not essentially ground having reasons, according to dualists. They merely 
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cause experiences that essentially provide reasons. Likewise, other macro properties in 
nature do not have built in epistemic significance. For instance, having the physical 
property weighing 180 lbs. doesn’t essentially give you a reason to self-attribute that 
property, in the way that having the experiential property feeling searing pain does.   
Next, novel standout determinables. We have a concept of qualitative resemblance: 
quality x resembles quality y more than quality z. It has the following features. First, it 
is not resemblance “in a respect”. For instance, smell qualities do not resemble in “re-
spects”. They simply resemble more or less closely. Second, it is simply in their essences 
that they stand in this relation; it is not grounded in anything more fundamental. Third, 
it is also a “standout” relation (perhaps a fundamental relation) like no other. When 
quality x resembles quality y more than z, there is never another, “equally good” sense 
in which x is more like z than y. We can stipulate that properties form a “standout de-
terminable” just in case they stand in the special relation of qualitative resemblance to 
each other and to no other qualities. Properties belonging to different such tightknit 
families – for instance a color and a smell – are maximally different; they incommensura-
ble.  
Now imagine the world before sentient organism appeared. And suppose that an aus-
tere physicalism applies to this pre-sentient reality – what I call “identity physicalism”. Reality 
is devoid of the qualities we experience, as Galileo taught us. As insentient nature 
evolves, “new” types of macro properties appear: chemical properties reflectance prop-
erties, geological, and so on. But they do not uniquely divide into nonoverlapping, in-
commensurable tightknit families, where the members of each family stand in the single, 
standout relation x qualitatively resembles y more than z. They are just different arrange-
ments of the same fundamental ingredients that were in reality at the start; and their 
resemblances and differences can be measured in many different, equally good ways.  
Dualists hold that, when brains evolved and created conscious experiences of sensible 
colors, smells, tastes, pains, and so on, something radically different happened. I think one 
way to put one’s finger on what was so novel here is that, unlike macro properties in the 
rest of nature (molecular properties, reflectance properties, biological properties, and so 
on), these qualities (and, derivatively, our experiences of them) do form many wholly 
novel, standout determinables: color qualities, smell qualities, pain qualities, and so on. 
They uniquely divide into a handful of nonoverlapping, incommensurable tightknit 
families, where the members of the families stand in a single, standout relation x quali-
tatively resembles y more than z. In this way, they are very different from all other macro 
properties in nature (including the neural properties that underlie them). 
Finally, radical macro-level discontinuities. Elsewhere in nature, where there are 
synchronous determination relations, similarities and differences at “higher” levels are 
matched by similarities at “lower” levels, at least if we measure the similarities right. (In 
fact, if identity physicalism is true, so that the “high level” is identical with the “low 
level”, this must be the case, in some sense.) But, on dualism, the dependence of the 
experiential on the physical is not like this. For instance, one brain state results in the 
experience of red, and another brain state results in the smell of citrus. The two brain 
states are really quite similar; although they take place in different parts of the brain, 
they are after all just different patterns of firing in the same types of neurons. But, on 
dualism, they result in experiences that are entirely incommensurable. Or consider a pat-
tern of neural firing that underlying a conscious experience and another one that doesn’t 
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underlie any conscious experience at all (you could undergo it while sleepwalking). 
Again, they are fundamentally quite similar. But on dualism the first results in a conscious 
experience with technicolor phenomenology while the second grounds nothing interesting at 
all. So there is a massive difference in what they result in. Indeed, under dualism, the line 
between the conscious and the nonconscious is the biggest line in all of reality.  
In sum, dualism faces three big problems: the complexity problem, the nonuni-
formity problem, and the causal problem. We have reason to think nature is not like 
this. At least, we don’t want nature to be like this. It would be a real disappointment.  
 
2. Identity Physicalism Achieves the Physicalist Dream 
 
2.1 Identity physicalism explained 
I will now introduce “identity physicalism” and then summarize the arguments for pre-
ferring it to dualism: the argument from simplicity, the argument from uniformity, and 
the causal argument. 
David Lewis (1994) nicely captures the view I call “identity physicalism” in the fol-
lowing passage:  
 
Imagine a grid of a million tiny spots — pixels — each of which can be made 
light or dark. When some are light and some are dark, they form a picture, 
replete with interesting intrinsic gestalt properties. The case evokes reduc-
tionist comments. Yes, the picture really does exist. Yes, it really does have 
those gestalt properties. However, the picture and the properties reduce to 
the arrangement of light and dark pixels. They are nothing over and above 
the pixels. They make nothing true that is not made true already by the pix-
els. They could go unmentioned in an inventory of what there is without 
thereby rendering that inventory incomplete. The [dependence] of mind and 
all else upon the arrangement of atoms in the void — or whatever replaces 
atoms in the void in true physics — is another case [of reduction]. 
 
In order to formulate identity physicalism, we first need two ideas on the table.  
First, the austere fundamental base. This includes everything that can be expressed in 
a fundamental language for describing our world. To begin with, we assume that there 
is some set of fundamental global dynamic laws (e. g. describing the evolution of the 
quantum state). They govern fundamental properties and relations that belong to very 
small things and that are widespread in nature (e. g. position, energy, spin, particle num-
ber).2 To handle quantum entanglement, we may need to include a fundamental entan-
glement plural property holding among particles (Bohn 2012). The pattern of instanti-
ation of these properties at a time, together with these laws, completely determines the 
probabilities of all possible future world-states. The “austere fundamental language” in-
clude predicates expressing all these properties and relations. It also includes predicates 
                                               
2 These fundamental physical properties could turn out be  “quiddities” (Chalmers 2012). Identity 
physicalism is neutral here.    
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expressing all fundamental spatio-temporal relations. If there is an irreducible law-mak-
ing relation (“nomic necessitation”) or sentential operator (“it is a law of nature that . . 
.”), it includes that too. It includes fundamental logical vocabulary, including that of 
modal logic and mereology. It includes lambda-abstraction, allowing for the formation 
of complex predicates. It includes names of all fundamental physical items. If the identity 
physicalist likes unrestricted mereological composition and ZCF set-theory, it includes 
the ideology of these theories and names for all the sums and sets constructible from the 
fundamental physical items. If the identity physicalist thinks that numbers are sui generis, 
it includes language for talking about them. If the identity physicalist accepts “neces-
sitism” about properties (necessarily, all properties exist necessarily), it includes all pred-
icates for all possible alien fundamental properties. For they exist at our world even if 
they are not instantiated in our world.  
A second idea that will help us formulate Lewis’s vision of the world is that of gen-
eralized identity, recently discussed by Cian Dorr (2016). Lewis himself uses the dark 
word “reduction”. But I find the idea of generalized identity more clear. We are all 
familiar with identity statements like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ in which the expressions 
flanking “is” are denoting phrases. We also have a grip on identity claims like “to be a 
vixen is to be a female fox” in which the expressions flanking “is” are not denoting 
phrases. Here “is” combines with two predicates to make a sentence, rather than two 
denoting phrases.  
According to Dorr, the “is” in “to be vixen is to be a female fox” cannot be analyzed 
in more fundamental terms - no more than the “is” in “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. In 
particular, Dorr would reject the view of Gideon Rosen (2105) that it can be analyzed 
in terms of “metaphysical necessity”, “essence” and “grounding”. In fact, Dorr (2016: 
69, 79) says that these are dark notions that we should avoid unless they can be explained 
in terms of identifications. For instance, he suggests that for something to be metaphys-
ically necessary is for it to follow from identifications and logic.  
If there are properties, then “to be a vixen to be a female fox” implies that the prop-
erty of being a vixen is identical with the (conjunctive) property of being a fox and being 
female. But “to be a vixen is to be a female fox” should not be equated with such a 
property-identity. It could be accepted by nominalists who reject properties.  
Now we can formulate identity physicalism as two claims. First, every thing in our 
world is identical with something that you can name in the austere fundamental lan-
guage (a fundamental physical thing, or a sum of them, or a set constructible by them). 
Second, every property instantiated in our world is identical with a property expressed by 
a predicate (perhaps an infinitely complex predicate) in the austere fundamental lan-
guage. For instance, for a sum of two atoms to be carbon monoxide is for one part to be a 
carbon atom, the other part to be an oxygen atom, and for the parts to be bonded. This goes for 
biological properties, and even conscious properties like being conscious of the quality red. 
They are all complex properties like this. Since “to be F is to be G” make sense even if 
there are not properties, we could formulate identity physicalism in a nominalistically-
acceptable way. However, I will continue to talk about properties for ease of expression.3  
                                               
3 Depending on how physics turns out, identity physicalism may imply that reality differs from 
how it appears – a kind of generalized Galilean view. For instance, David Albert (1996: 277) says 
that quantum mechanics implies that “the space we live in is configuration space” and “whatever 
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Besides David Lewis, Ted Sider defends identity physicalism.4  For instance, after 
describing his own view of the “austere fundamental language”, Sider writes:  
 
What remains is to sketch a metaphysical semantics for ordinary and scien-
tific language. This is a formidable task, since the worldview is so austere. 
What of predicates like ‘x is a table’ or ‘y is a person’? How can we say, in 
the language of physics, logic, and set theory, which sets of points of 
spacetime are tables and persons? Of course I have no clue. Nevertheless, I 
am confident that a metaphysical semantics could in principle be given. The 
reason is that the array of definable relations is extremely rich. 
 
Notice that the austere language has the resources to form predicates expressing 
“functional properties”: having some property that necessitates property P. So identity 
physicalists can identify macro properties with functional properties. The austere lan-
guage might also contain names for alien properties. So identity physicalists can identity 
macro properties with properties “disjunctive properties” with alien disjuncts. These 
points are relevant to the problem for “multiple realizability” for identity physicalism - 
a problem we will look at presently.  
When it comes to conscious experiences, identity physicalists have a variety of op-
tions. For instance, if they accept intentionalism, they might identify sensible properties 
(color qualities, smell qualities, etc.) with external physical properties (reflectance prop-
erties, chemical properties, etc.), and they might identify the conscious-of relation with 
a complex “tracking” relation (Dretske 1995, Tye 2000). Or they might reject inten-
tionalism, and identify experiences with brain states that don’t essentially represent an-
ything (just as words don’t represent anything). 
 
2.2 Identity physicalism: maximally simple and uniform 
Identity physicalism holds that our world is like Lewis’s pixel world: maximally simple 
and uniform. 
First, simplicity. In Lewis’s pixel world, there are “macro-level” properties like mak-
ing a pixel face (a shape that looks like a human face), but they reduce to complex condi-
tions definable in fundamental terms. So our theory of the pixel world is simple in terms 
of ideology and ontology. In addition, we don’t need any special non-logical principle 
to explain why, when the pixels are arranged a certain way, they make a pixel face. In the 
same way, unlike dualism, identity physicalism about world is simple. It does not require 
any special psychophysical laws to explain the emergence of conscious properties from 
the fundamental physical and topic-neutral description of reality. In fact, it needs no 
                                               
impression we have to the contrary (whatever impression we have, say, of living in a three-dimen-
sional space, or in a four-dimensional space-time) is flatly illusory”. For relevant discussion, see 
Chalmers (2012: 290-298). 
 
4 Sider appeals to the idea of a “metaphysical analysis”, which I will not go into here. Cian Dorr 
is another proponent of identity physicalism (personal discussion). In print?  
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special extra-logical principles at all (including “grounding laws”).5 True, it asserts iden-
tity claims. But identity claims have a very special: they do not add to the complexity of our 
theory of the world. (Pace Chalmers, this is true even if they are deeply a posteriori.) For 
instance, if you believe in Mark Twain (that is, Samuel Clemens), then “Mark Twain is 
Samuel Clemens” doesn’t add to the complexity of your theory of the world. The same 
is true of claims of the form “to be F is to be G”. So identity physicalism is maximally 
simple. 6 
Second, uniformity. We saw in §1 that dualists hold that something happens in con-
nection with brains that is anomalous in many ways. Identity physicalists avoid the 
anomalism of the experiential. 
First, pop-up. Identity physicalism avoids irreducible properties “popping” up when 
brains evolve. Identity physicalism was true in the first moments after the big bang. And 
if it was true at t, it is plausible that it is true at moment t + 1. And that is precisely what 
identity physicalist say: it is true at all times and places. True, new properties come to 
be instantiated. But they are always just arrangements of the fundamental physical and 
topic-neutral properties. 
Next, big difference. As noted above, dualists often hold that experiences have a 
metaphysical structure (e. g. acquaintance with Galilean qualities) different from that of 
the brain states they depend on. But, of course, identity physicalism rules this out this 
kind of big difference. For instance, if experiences are brain states, they cannot have a 
different metaphysical structure from those brain states.  
Next, normativity. We saw that, among macro properties in nature, dualists will say 
that conscious properties (pains, pleasures, visual experiences) stand out in that it is part 
of their essences to ground normative and epistemic reasons. They glow with normative 
power. This makes them look very special. Identity physicalists will deny all this. For 
instance, they will say that pain is just C-fiber stimulation, and value and disvalue of a 
thing reduces to a response-dependent property involving whether the thing is apt to be 
desired or not desired, or something along these lines (Lewis). C-fiber stimulation only 
has disvalue because we happen not to like it (which itself reduces to something func-
tional); and this is not part of the essence of C-fiber but a contingent, relational feature 
of it. Likewise, it is not the case that undergoing C-fiber (hence pain), just by virtue of 
his intrinsic nature, grounds a reason to believe that you are in that state. In general, 
take all the complex properties definable in terms of the fundamental base. None of them 
                                               
5 In Pautz (2004) I argue that identity physicalism can be quite complex because it requires nec-
essary connections between basic properties and countless complex properties – necessary con-
nections that can look strange. But identity physicalists could be nominalists who don’t believe in 
any properties at all, whether “simple” or “complex” (Sider 2011). In addition, even if identity 
physicalists do believe in complex properties, they might have a quite simple and general “maxi-
malist” theory of them (Zalta 1988).  
 
6 Some (Papineau 1993, Dorr 2016) have said that identifications “don’t cry out for explanation”. 
I am not saying this because I am unsure what it means. Instead, I am saying that they don’t add 
to the complexity of our theory. In fact, identity physicalists can hold that the “book of the world” 
(Sider 2011) can be complete even if such identifications are not included in the book and it is 
entirely written exclusively in the austere fundamental language. This kind of identity physicalism 
may require illusionism about consciousness in the sense of Chalmers (2018).  
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glow with essential normative power. So, unlike dualism, identity physicalism avoids 
normative singularity.7 Once again, identity physicalism is more uniform.  
Next, stand out determinables. Above we saw that another way in which dualism is 
non-uniform is that it holds that conscious properties are unlike all other macro prop-
erties in nature in that they form novel standout determinables, where this was explained 
in terms of a standout relation x qualitatively resembles y more than z. Identity physicalists 
will deny this too. They will say that it may seem to be the case, but we must give it up. 
For they will say that all macro properties, including experiences, are just different com-
plexes of the austere fundamental properties. For instance, maybe experiences are dis-
tributed neural patterns, which in turn are identical with enormously complex properties 
definable in the austere fundamental base. Then they are all fundamentally similar to 
one another. They do not divide uniquely into non-overlapping families, where the 
members of the same families stand in the standout relation x qualitatively resembles y 
more than z and members of different families are incomparable. For instance, there are 
many different but equally good ways to group neural patterns into nonoverlapping 
families. Thus, our experiences are just such neural properties, they do not form novel 
stand out determinables, in the sense explained above. 
Finally, and relatedly, dualism requires radical macro-level discontinuities, but 
identity physicalism avoids them. On identity physicalism, it is not the case that some 
neural patterns result in variety of wonderful color experiences, others result in a variety 
of incommensurable smell experiences, while still others result in no states of conscious-
ness at all. On this view, neural patterns do not “result in” anything distinct from them 
all.  
In short, dualism holds that conscious properties appear in connection with brains 
that are irreducible, metaphysically special, have built-in normative glow, belong to 
novel standout determinables, and make for radical discontinuities in nature. By con-
trast, identity physicalism achieves completely uniform picture of reality. Just as in the 
pixel-world, all macro level properties are different constructions of a fundamental set 
of properties and relations; they are all fundamentally the same. True, our “phenomenal 
concepts” of them might make some of the – the conscious properties – seem special. 
But in reality they are nothing special.  
Finally, mental causation. As many have discussed, identity physicalists can accept 
that instantiations of the multiply realizable mental properties cause of our behaviors, 
in addition to instantiations of “realizer” properties. This is an unobjectionable form of 
overdetermination (Loewer 2015). 
Because of the explanatory gap, the physicalist idea that conscious experiences are 
necessitated by austere physical conditions certain lacks a priori support. How then could 
we ever justify such a strong modal claim? Identity physicalists can offer a two-step jus-
tification by identification.  
 
1. The speculative hypothesis that conscious properties, like all other macro proper-
ties in nature, are identical with extremely complex properties (e. g. functional 
properties) defined in terms of fundamental base has the great theoretical virtues of 
simplicity and uniformity. 
                                               
7 For more on this issue, see Lee (2019) and Pautz (2020).     
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2. This hypothesis entails the strong necessitation thesis required by physicalism.  
3. So, by standard abductive methodology, that hypothesis is probably true.  
 
2.3 Against identity physicalism: the special nature of consciousness 
I would like to believe identity physicalism. But I think it cannot be right. 
We can distinguish between two types of arguments against identity physicalism. 
There are general arguments to the effect that it fails for all macro-level properties. Then 
there are arguments from the special nature of conscious properties. I think that the gen-
eral arguments fail but certain “special nature” arguments succeed.  
One general argument against identity physicalism is an argument from failure. No 
one has given a counterexample-free biconditional analysis of the boring property being 
a mountain (Fodor). We certainly cannot keep on going until we reach the fundamental 
base. So being a mountain is an extra, irreducible property in sense that is not identical 
with any complex property (not even an infinitely complex property) definable in terms 
of the fundamental base. It is necessitated by a huge range of austere fundamental con-
ditions; but it is not identical with any of them, their disjunction, or a “functional prop-
erty” defined in fundamental terms. So we need to believe in necessary “bridge laws” 
that aren’t derivable from identifications and logic.  
But this argument against identity physicalism is unconvincing. Here is a quick way 
to see this. In pixel-world example mentioned earlier, we cannot define being a pixel face 
in terms of pixel states and relations, given all the varieties of pixel faces (sad, happy, 
etc.). But, clearly, in the pixel-world, all properties are just complex properties con-
structible from the fundamental base. Likewise, in the actual world, given the funda-
mental base, “the array of definable properties and relations is extremely rich” (Sider 
2011: 130, 294). Some of them are bound to be such that their extensions, in this world 
and other worlds, match pretty well that of “is a mountain”. In the interest of simplicity, 
why not say “is a mountain” expresses one of these definable properties (relative to a 
precisification), rather than positing a mysterious extra irreducible property for it to pick 
out, requiring its own extra-logical bridge laws? 
Another general argument against identity physicalism concerns multiple realiza-
bility (Schaffer 2013). I just said that there are bound to be definable properties or rela-
tions whose extensions across worlds match that of “is mountain”. But maybe this is not 
so. Intuitively, “is a mountain” can apply in possible worlds which the fundamental prop-
erties are not mass, charge and spin, but some “alien” properties. So, while in the actual 
world it is grounded in an open-ended range of possible fundamental configurations, it 
is not identical with any of them or their disjunction.  
This argument, too, is unconvincing. First, if the multiple realizability were a good 
argument, then it would presumably equally show that in the pixel-world some high-
level properties are not identical with complex properties built from the fundamental 
properties. But then something has gone wrong, because it is quite clear that in this 
world all high-level properties are identical with such complex properties. Second, turn-
ing back to our world, the fundamental language allows us to construct functional prop-
erties. This can help the identity physicalist accommodate multiple realizability (Sider 
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2013).8 Third, if the identity physicalist accepts “necessitism” about properties (all prop-
erties exist necessarily), the fundamental language includes all predicates for all possible 
alien fundamental properties, since they exist at our world even if they are not instanti-
ated in our world. So, perhaps multiply realizable macro predicates like “is a mountain” 
express, relative to some acceptable precisifications, infinitary disjunctions, where some 
disjuncts are arrays of physical properties and others are arrays of alien properties but 
where the disjuncts are “similar” by some measure. Fourth and last, even if the funda-
mental base only contains the fundamental properties instantiated at our world, counter-
part theory applied to properties might be used to accommodate “the property of being 
a mountain might be instantiated even if the world contained only alien properties”. For 
even if “being a mountain” here refers (relative to every precisification) to a complex 
property C built from (in part) physical properties instantiated at our world, this sentence 
might come out true, if in an alien world a suitable counterpart of C is instantiated by the 
mountain-like things in that world. 
So general arguments against identity physicalism fall short. There are also argu-
ments from special nature. For instance, John Campbell claims that “redness is not a 
microphysical property” because in the “special case” or colors “the nature of the prop-
erty is transparent to us” (1993: 258). Mark Johnston suggests that conscious acquaintance 
is special: “Herein lies the deep inadequacy of reductive materialism: There is no reduc-
tion of a relation which essentially involves disclosure to any combination of relations 
which essentially do not” (2011: 215-216). And Schaffer relies on intuitions of distinct-
ness, saying that experiential and physical-functional properties “look like clearly differ-
ent properties” (2020). 
Elsewhere I have developed my own arguments from the special nature of con-
sciousness against identity physicalism. Briefly, they are as follows. 
First, the argument from internal intentionality (Pautz 2010 and 2019; Mendelovici 
2018). Suppose you see a tomato. A brain in a void might have the tomato experience in 
which it is conscious of the shape round and the quality red. But, the BIV is cut-off from 
the world and bears no interesting causal-informational physical relations to these prop-
erties – no relations constructible from the austere fundamental base. So the tomato 
experience involves standing in an irreducible mental relation to red and round (akin to 
Russellian acquaintance). Our usual externalist models for reducing intentionality (e. g. 
Neander 2017, Dretske 1995, Tye 2000) do not apply to conscious intentionality. Fur-
ther, Galileo was right: the property red you are conscious of seeing a tomato isn’t in-
stantiated in the physical world at all.  
Second, the argument from significance (Pautz 2017). The conscious-of relation has 
a special normative and dissimilarity-making significance that no physical-functional re-
lations possess. So, for this reason too, it must be taken to be distinct from any physical-
functional relation.  
Third, the argument from determinacy (Pautz 2017). The conscious-of relation is 
a source of determinate intentionality. When you are conscious of a quality, you are able 
to easily and determinately think about that quality. In these fundamental cases, radical 
                                               
8 In responding to Schaffer (2013), Sider (2013) notes that the functionalist account of multiple 
realizability works smoothly for identity physicalists who are realists about properties. He does 
consider another problem arising out of multiple realizability, but it only arises for nominalists 
like himself.  
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Quinean indeterminacy worries just do not get a grip. I have argued that this requires 
that we give up identity physicalism for the conscious-of relation.  
 
3. Nonidentity Physicalism for Consciousness 
 
Arguments from the special nature of consciousness against identity physicalism will be 
controversial. But, for the sake of discussion, let us assume going forward that they in-
deed undermine identity physicalism for consciousness.  
For the sake of concreteness, I will also assume that these arguments support the 
idea that consciousness have a special nature in the following respects: 
 
1. Experience consist in standing in an irreducible conscious-of relation to ostensible 
states of affairs involve perceptible properties like red and round, and so are very 
different from the brain states they depend on. 
2. It’s in the constitutive essence of experiences (pains, pleasures, visual experiences), 
but not the underlying physical-functional states, that they ground reasons to be-
lieve and desire certain things.  
3. Experiences belong to novel stand-out determinables, unlike other macro proper-
ties in nature. 
4. Experience makes make for radical discontinuities or radical breaks in nature, as when 
one neural pattern grounds an experience but another neural pattern grounds noth-
ing interesting at all.  
 
Now 1-4 often go with dualism, but they are also consistent with a form of physicalism. 
Even if conscious experiences are very different from complex conditions definable in 
terms of the austere fundamental, they might yet be “metaphysically necessitated by” or 
“grounded in” such conditions. This is a form of nonidentity physicalism. Compare the 
way in which Mooreans hold that normative properties are distinct from natural prop-
erties because of their “special natures”, but then go on to say that they are “metaphys-
ically necessitated” by natural properties.  
In the present section, I will describe nonidentity physicalism and its different 
forms. In subsequent sections, I want to consider whether nonidentity physicalism might 
achieve the dream of a uniform and simple account of reality. I will suggest that it 
achieves that dream no better than dualism. There is no reason to prefer it to dualism.  
To get the feel for nonidentity physicalism for consciousness, I will start with the 
form I would myself defend were to go in for this view: Galilean nonidentity physical-
ism.  
 
3.1 An illustration: Galilean nonidentity physicalism for consciousness 
As illustrated in Figure, Galilean nonidentity physicalism is just like Galilean dualism 
briefly introduced in §1.1, but it upgrades the psychophysical laws from contingent laws 
(thin arrow) to metaphysically necessary grounding laws (tick arrow).  
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Figure 1 
 
To understand, Galilean nonidentity physicalism, let’s first say more about Galilean 
dualism than we did in §1.2. Galilean dualists will hope for psychophysical laws with the 
same simplicity and systematicity as the fundamental physical laws – laws that could be 
written on a t-shirt (Chalmers 1995). And there is indeed some evidence of systematic 
correlations.  
For instance, several recent studies show that, in visual area 4 (V4), neural similarity 
space matches the similarity space of the colors we are conscious of (Bohon et al. 2016). 
So maybe one law looks like this:  
 
Color Law: If the fundamental physical and topic-neural base properties are 
arranged so that a subject undergoes V4 brain state B, then they are in the 
distinct state of standing in the irreducible conscious-of relation to color f(B), 
where f is a systematic function from V4 brain states onto Galilean colors.  
 
In general, there is evidence distributed neural patterns vary along parameters corre-
sponding experiential parameters. For instance, if you firing rates of pain-matrix neu-
rons increases, then the intensity of the Galilean pain you are conscious of increases in 
proportion (Coghill et al. 1999). So dualists can hope that there are such laws for other 
ranges of Galilean properties.  
For the sake of discussion, I will assume a brain-based (or “internalist”) account of 
the physical basis of experience. And I will assume that there such systematic correlations 
between neural states and experiential states.  
Now we can explain Galilean nonidentity physicalism (Figure 1b). It is exactly like 
Galilean dualism as regards ontology. Just like Galilean dualists, nonidentity physicalists 
hold that, in connection with certain brain states (but not others), novel properties ap-
pear that are very different from other macro properties in nature in respects 1-4.  
The only difference between Galilean dualism and Galilean nonidentity physicalism 
concerns the status of the Color Law and other psychophysical laws connecting brain 
states with distinct conscious states. While Galilean dualism holds that the Color Law 
is a contingent nomic law, Galilean nonidentity physicalism holds that it is a grounding 
law. Necessarily, being in in V4 brain state B always grounds standing in the irreducible 
conscious-of relation to color f(B). 
Grounding is supposed to be an undefinable relation among distinct facts that we 
can get grasp by considering examples (Fine 2012, Rosen 2012, Schaffer 2020). For in-
stance, the natural fact that an action causes pain for fun grounds the distinct normative 
fact that you ought not to do it. The fact that there exists an immaterial hole in the 
cheese is grounded in the arrangement of the matter in the cheese. Galilean nonidentity 
physicalism claims that the same connection holds between our brain states and our very 
different conscious experiences. For the sake of formulating nonidentity physicalism, I 
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will assume that we do have a grip on this indefinable connection (but at the end of the 
essay, in §7, I will question this). In assuming that grounding is indefinable, I am not 
assuming that specific experience-physical grounding connections cannot be explained. 
In §3.3 we will see that some nonidentity physicalists may explain them in terms of the 
“essences” of experiences.  
Indeed, more extreme forms of Galilean nonidentity physicalism are possible. 
Maybe, when your brain undergoes the right brain states, this grounds the fact that there 
exists an immaterial soul and a reddish and round sense datum that the soul is acquainted 
with (Lockean “representative realism’). On the view I have in mind, there are such im-
material subjects and objects in the same sense in which there are electrons. Only there 
are such items because (in the sense of metaphysical explanation) you undergo the right 
brain states. Compare: there are immaterial holes in the cheese only when its matter is 
arranged in a certain way.9  
Dualists recognize possible worlds in which simple subjects (e. g. angels) have the 
same tomato experience you have but this not caused by or grounded in anything more 
basic. Some nonidentity physicalists might recognize such possible worlds. Even if in 
the actual world the experience is grounded in a brain state, perhaps in another world it 
might float free from any ground at all.  
In general, nonidentity physicalism holds that the actual world is very different form 
Lewis’s pixel world. When brain states of a certain complexity evolved, very unique 
properties “popped up” that are distinct from all complex conditions definable in terms 
of the austere fundamental base. Nevertheless, they are “grounded in” such conditions, 
where grounding is a basic connection that we can get a grip on from examples.  
You might think that Galilean nonidentity physicalism cannot be right. If experi-
ences are very different from brain states in respects 1-4, how can they be grounded in 
such brain states? How can the Color Law be a grounding law? 
But, in general, the grounded fact must be distinct from the facts that ground it, since 
the grounds explain the grounded fact, and nothing explains itself. Why then cannot the 
grounds (in this case, brain states) be very different from the grounded (in this case, 
experiences)?  
You might think that the Color Law cannot be a grounding law because it is a pos-
teriori and grounding connections must be a priori. But grounding is not analyzed in 
                                               
9 A terminological note on “identifications”: In 2.1, I adopted Dorr’s account of identifications of 
the form “to be F is to be G” as generalized identities, so that (like identity among objects) it is 
not to be further analyzed. By contrast, Rosen (2015) explains “identifications” as metaphysically 
necessary biconditional grounding claims. On his view, if the ground physicalist were to accept 
the sense datum view and then to go on to accept the biconditional grounding claim necessarily, 
anyone is acquainted with a red and round sense datum (quite different from a brain state) iff and because 
(grounding “because”) they are in brain state B, then their view entails to be acquainted with a nonphys-
ical red and round sense datum just is to be in brain state B. I think this shows that Rosen’s account of 
“to be F is to be G” is incorrect. If the experience involves a red and round sense datum but the 
brain state doesn’t, how can it be that to have the experience just is to be in the brain state? Rosen 
(in discussion) has offered replies. In any case, in this essay, I am simply stipulating that identifi-
cations of the form “to be F is to be G” are to be understood in Dorr’s way. And on this under-
standing physicalists who accept the sense datum view, or Galilean intentionalism, don’t accept 
identifications between the experiential and the physical-functional, even if they accept the rele-
vant biconditional grounding claims.  
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epistemic terms. Grounding connections are out in the world, just like nomic connec-
tions. Why then should they be knowable a priori?  There is conceptual room for a pos-
teriori grounding laws, just as there is conceptual room for a posteriori nomic laws.10 
 
3.2 Other examples: Campbell, Johnston, and Schaffer 
Many have defended something like nonidentity physicalism for consciousness.  
In the previous section, I said science supports experiential internalism. John Camp-
bell (1993, 2020) disagrees. He defends an externalist form of nonidentity physicalism.  
He agrees with we Galileans that, when you view a tomato, the quality red is a “primi-
tive” property radically different from the reflectance property of the tomato. But 
whereas we Galileans sweep the quality red into the dustbin of the mind, Campbell keeps 
it where it seems to be: redness is a property of the tomato grounded in its reflectance 
property (1993: 259).11 In general, something special happens in connection with the 
reflectance properties of objects: the reflectance properties of objects, but presumably not 
their other physical properties (charges, masses), ground a gamut of special qualities that 
are very different from those reflectance properties. Furthermore, according to Camp-
bell, you stand in something like a primitive relation of Russellian acquaintance to the 
instantiation of redness by the tomato, grounded in (but not reducible to) the long causal 
process going from the tomato and ending with your brain state.  
Mark Johnston (1997, ms) also defends nonidentity physicalism for consciousness: 
he holds that “[appearings of manifest qualities] are constituted by but not reducible to 
patterns of causation among things”, adding that “the appearing to subjects of manifest 
qualities can seem very special” and “one may say with some justice that the existence of 
appearings in a world of things is a mystery”.  
Finally, Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 2020) has proposed “ground functionalism”. 
Schaffer holds that different brain states ground different experiences by virtue of playing 
different functional roles with respect to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. However, 
he is neutral on the metaphysics of experiences (e. g. Galilean intentionalism, sense da-
tum view, the “raw feel view”) and the precise input-output functional bases of different 
experiences. (I noted above that research instead suggests that variations in experiences 
most systematically depend on variations in distributed neural patterns.)  
All of these philosophers defend a posteriori grounding physicalism because physical-
experience connections are evidently not a priori. Indeed, Johnston (1997, ms) and 
Schaffer (2017) generalize the explanatory gap, holding that interlevel grounding con-
nections in nature are generally a posteriori.  
 
                                               
10 Chalmers (2010: 184-191) holds that metaphysical necessities (framed in transparent language) 
must always knowable a priori. Maybe then the same could true for grounding connections? But 
Chalmers analyzes metaphysical necessity in terms of a priority (so that, e. g., physicalism becomes 
an epistemic thesis). I am assuming that grounding is not analyzed in epistemic terms, so there 
remains conceptual room for deeply a posteriori grounding connections.  
 
11 Campbell holds that the color red is “primitive” or “fundamental” in the sense that there is no 
interesting identification of the form “to be red is to be . . .”. But, in another sense, he holds that 
the color red is not primitive. Whenever something is red, this is grounded in the thing having a 
certain reflectance. If grounding is a primitive notion independent of the notion of identification, 
nonidentity physicalism is a possible view. 
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3.3 A few questions for nonidentity physicalists 
Nonidentity physicalists differ very questions.  
First, nonidentity physicalists can differ over the metaphysics of experience and the 
physical-functional grounds of different experiences. As already discussed, they might 
accept Galilean intentionalism or naïve realism. Other options include the sense datum 
view and the “raw feel” view. They might also differ on their physical-functional 
grounds of experiences.  
Second, nonidentity physicalism can be restricted or general. For instance, I myself 
strongly favor the austere identity physicalism of Lewis and Sider applies to all con-
sciousness-independent reality. Arguments from the special nature of consciousness 
show that identity physicalism fails only in the special case of conscious experiences. So 
if I were an identity physicalist, I would accept restricted nonidentity physicalism.  
Other nonidentity physicalists might say that, despite my criticisms above, the ar-
guments from failure and multiple realizability all show that identity physicalism fails 
even for macro properties that have nothing to do with consciousness, such as being a 
mountain (Schaffer 2013).  
Third, there is a question about whether nonidentity physicalists can somehow ex-
plain grounding connections. For instance, Galilean nonidentity physicalism holds that 
the Color Law is a grounding law connecting distinct physical and experiential states. 
Can they explain this grounding law?  
Some nonidentity physicalists would be content to take this grounding law as basic 
(Schaffer 2020). But others will wish to explain it. For instance, some recognize the con-
cept of essence in addition to the concept of ground: “it is in the essence of X that p” 
(Fine 1994). And they hold that in general grounding connections are explained by the 
essences of items involved in the grounded facts (Fine 2012, Rosen 2010). Such noni-
dentity physicalists will declare that, even if states of acquaintance with Galilean color 
aren’t identical with brain states, it is just “in their essences” that they are systematically 
grounded in brain states. This bedrock essentialist truth explains the Color Law under-
stood as a grounding law. (It’s an explanation that easy to come by!) On this view, some 
things that are true by virtue of the essences of our experiences of Galilean colors are at 
the surface: they involve an irreducible acquaintance relation to color qualities with cer-
tain qualitative natures, they glow with intrinsic value, and so on. But another thing that 
is true by virtue of their essences is “hidden”, namely that they are systematically 
grounded in brain states.  
As with the ideology of grounding, I will assume for the sake of discussion that we 
have a grip on the heavy-duty ideology of essence that is required to make sense of this 
claim (but see §7). 
 
3.4 Bling and zing: can nonidentity physicalists identify a big difference from dualism?   
Every version of nonidentity physicalism has a dualist counterpart. For instance, imagine 
a nonidentity physicalist who hold that experiences are nonrelational “raw feels” 
grounded in brain states, rather than mysterious intentional relations to uninstantiated 
Galilean qualities. It has a dualist counterpart that downgrades the connection between 
brain states and distinct raw feels to a nomic one.  
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I think we need to ask whether nonidentity physicalists like Campbell, Johnston and 
Schaffer can identify a big difference between their view and the counterpart dualist 
view.  
For instance, Chalmers is open to Galilean dualism. Suppose he accepts it. The 
Color Law is a basic nomic law. Chalmers is also a non-Humean who holds that “it is 
law that p” is a primitive sentential operator (2012: 337). In this essay, I will assume such 
a non-Humean “governing” conception of laws of nature. Now imagine that Schaffer 
accepts Galilean nonidentity physicalism. He holds that the Color Law is a basic 
grounding law, where “grounding” is another primitive notion.  
Some philosophers may be inclined to complain in Humean fashion of the obscurity 
of “secret connexions” like grounding and lawfully determining that go beyond regular-
ities. However, for the sake of argument, in this essay I will assume that we have a prim-
itive grip on the difference between grounding and lawfully determining (but see §7). 
These assumptions are needed to sense of the difference between Schaffer (nonidentity 
physicalism) and Chalmers (dualism). My question is: is there a big difference between 
Schaffer and Chalmers? 
This is relevant to the subsequent discussion. If there is no big difference between 
nonidentity physicalism and dualism, it is hard to see how we might have a big reason 
to prefer nonidentity physicalism to dualism.  
In order to make the question vivid, let’s introduce some new terms. Let us say that 
F blings G when it is a nomic law that all Fs and Gs. And let say that  F zings G when it 
is the case that, whenever it is a fact that an individual is F, this grounds the fact that the 
individual is G.  So we have:  
 
Chalmers: brain state B merely blings acquaintance with red. 
Schaffer: no, brain state B zings acquaintance with red. 
 
Now blinging (lawfully determining) comes in probabilistic forms, even if it is de-
terministic in the present case. By contrast, blinging (grounding) is always deterministic. 
But both Chalmers and Schaffer hold that, in the present case, the connection is deter-
ministic. So this doesn’t identify a big difference between their views of the neural-ex-
periential connection.  
Chalmers holds that the connection is merely “nomically necessary” (zombies are 
possible), while Schaffer holds it is “metaphysically necessary” (zombies are impossible). 
Zinging is “modally stronger than” blinging. Isn’t that a big difference?  
However, Schaffer holds (2020: sect. 2.2) that these notions are not primitive but 
are themselves to be understood in terms of blinging and zinging, so that this difference 
(roughly) amounts to this: 
 
Chalmers: the connection between brain state B and acquaintance with red 
holds in all worlds with all the same blinging laws but fails in conceptually 
possible worlds outside this sphere.  
 
Schaffer: the connection holds in all worlds with the same zinging laws but 
fails in conceptually possible worlds outside this sphere.  
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And now we are back to where we started: what is the big difference?  
At this point, Schaffer might say his view and Chalmers’ imply very different claims 
about how “far away” zombie worlds are, even both views imply zombie worlds are easy 
to conceive. For suppose Chalmers is right that our brain states merely bling our distinct 
color experiences. Since we count bling connections (laws) as pretty important, we will 
count a zombie world where the actual neural-experiential bling connections are re-
moved as pretty far away. Now suppose Schaffer is right that our brain states zing our 
experiences. Then, since we count holding fixed zing (grounding) connections as even 
more important than holding fixed bling connections (natural laws) in reckoning across-
world similarity, we will count zombie worlds where the actual neural-experiential zing 
connections are removed as even farther away.  
But I think that Schaffer cannot say that this identifies a big objective difference be-
tween zinging and blinging. For (contrary to the depiction in Figure 1) it is not as if the 
zinging relation is a “big” glowing relation, while the blinging relation is a “small” one, 
so that if zombie worlds require removing the actual neural-experiential zinging rela-
tions that will make them “objectively” more dissimilar from actuality than if zombie 
worlds merely require removing the actual neural-experiential blinging connections. 
Therefore, Schaffer must say that this difference results from the conventional fact that 
we would “count” removing the actual neural-experiential zinging connections as a bigger 
difference from actuality than removing the actual neural-experiential blinging connections.12 
I conclude that Schaffer theory of the neural-experiential connection is barely dif-
ferent from Chalmers’ theory. But set that aside. Is there is any reason to prefer it to 
Chalmers’ theory? Does it better achieve the dream picture of reality that physicalists 
are after?  
 
4. Is Nonidentity Physicalism Simpler than Dualism? 
 
We will assume going forward that arguments from the special nature of consciousness 
show that experiences are distinct brain states and indeed all complex properties defin-
able from the fundamental based. Given this assumption, I will raise a skeptical challenge 
for the fallback position of nonidentity physicalism.  
In way, the skeptical challenge goes back to David Hume. Our evidence consists of 
neural-experiential regularities, like the regularity following from the Color Law. If 
there are “secret connexions” going beyond such regularities, how do we know about 
them? Given our present assumptions, the problem is even worse. We are assuming that 
there are two secret connections in reality: lawfully determining (blinging) and ground-
ing (zinging). If our evidence is limited to the Color Law regularity, what reason is there 
to think brain states ground distinct states of acquaintance with Galilean colors (noni-
dentity physicalism) rather than merely lawfully determining them (dualism)? Both hy-
potheses are explanatorily fruitful, in that they explain the regularity rather than taking 
it to be a “cosmic coincidence”.  
                                               
12 This shows that, even if you accept an “inflationary”, anti-Humeanism account of metaphysical 
necessity (in the sense of Sider 2011: chap. 12) who understands metaphysically necessity in terms 
of the scenarios consistent with some primitive “grounding (zinging) laws”, there remains a sig-
nificant degree of convention in your view.   
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Here it is natural for nonidentity physicalists to appeal to abductive methodology, 
or “inference to the best explanation” (Schaffer 2020: sect. 1.3). A big part of that meth-
odology concerns simplicity. We saw that identity physicalists can justify their view by 
appealing to this methodology (§2.2). But I will now argue that the hypothesis that the 
Color Law is a grounding law connecting distinct neural and experiential states cannot 
be justified on the grounds that it is simpler than the hypothesis that it is a nomic law. 
To illustrate, I will continue to focus on Galilean nonidentity physicalism.  
 
4.1 Galilean nonidentity physicalism is as complex as Galilean dualism 
Here is a plausible principle:  
 
Parity principle: If two theories assert the same laws connecting distinct states, 
and only differ on the modal (or epistemic status) of those laws, they are equally 
complex.    
 
To illustrate, suppose we know the fundamental laws of physics. And suppose that 
they turn out to be deterministic. Now imagine two philosophers who disagree about 
their status. Philosopher A says that they are primitive and contingent nomic laws. Phi-
losopher B says that they are metaphysically necessary grounding laws, even if they ap-
pear contingent to us. The initial state of the universe grounds every future state of the 
universe (more on this maverick view in §7)! Do we have a simplicity-based reason to 
prefer the second maverick hypothesis over the first? Clearly, we do not.   
Likewise, imagine again that Chalmers accepts Galilean dualism and Schaffer ac-
cepts a counterpart Galilean nonidentity physicalist view. They agree about the Color 
Law connecting brain states with distinct states of acquaintance with Galilean colors; 
both include it in their book of the world. They both agree that it cannot be derived 
from identifications and logic. They only disagree about the status of the Color Law. 
Chalmers says that it is a contingent nomic law. Schaffer says that it is a metaphysically 
necessary grounding law, even if it appears contingent to us. In the terminology of §3.4, 
Chalmers holds that it is a “bling” law while Schaffer holds that it is a “zing” law. Just as 
we have no simplicity-based reason to prefer the hypothesis of philosopher B over that of 
philosopher A, we have no simplicity-based reason to prefer Schaffer’s hypothesis to 
Chalmers’. Galilean nonidentity physicalism is just as complex as Galilean dualism.13  
To appreciate the complexity of nonidentity physicalism, compare it with identity 
physicalism. As we saw in §2.2, for identity physicalists, experience properties, like all 
                                               
13 Schaffer (in discussion) agrees that the Color Law adds to the complexity of our theory of the 
world whether it is a grounding law or a nomic law. But he holds that grounded entities don’t add 
to complexity (Schaffer 2015). However, even if this is true, it doesn’t show that Galilean dualism 
is simpler than Galilean nonidentity physicalism, since both are forms of “property dualism” that 
agree on the fundamental entities and only differ on the status of the Color Law. In addition, I 
don’t think it is true. For instance, take the nonidentity physicalist view (mentioned in §3.1) that 
there are immaterial sense data grounded in (zinged in) brain states and the counterpart dualist 
view that there are immaterial sense data nomically determined by (blinged by) brain states. Both 
views hold that “there are” sense data in the same sense in which “there are” electrons (there aren’t 
different modes of existence here). Contrary to Schaffer, I think that it’s obvious that both views 
are ontologically complex because both views hold that there are immaterial sense data very dif-
ferent from the brain states they depend on.  
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other properties, just are complex properties definable in terms of fundamental proper-
ties and relations. So for them the connection between the fundamental properties and 
all other properties is just a matter of logic (e. g. if something is F then it is F or G). By 
contrast, nonidentity physicalists deny that experience properties just are complex prop-
erties definable in terms of fundamental properties and relations. So it is inevitable that 
they need some additional, extra-logical “laws” connecting them to fundamental proper-
ties and relations, such as the Color Law. And it’s inevitable some of them will be basic. On 
their view, these basic inter-level laws are metaphysically necessary. On a counterpart 
dualist view, they are contingent. By the parity principle, they add equally to the com-
plexity of their theory of the world.  
I have been assuming that there is a relatively simple Color Law connecting brain 
states with experiences of Galilean colors. In a wonderful but neglected paper, “Flavors, 
Colors and God”, Robert M. Adams argued that this is not so. I am more optimistic 
than Adams.14 But suppose Adams is right. This doesn’t affect the parity point. Suppose 
that the Galilean dualist and the Galilean nonidentity physicalist accept the same raft of 
unsystematizable laws (in the worst case, one for every possible experience), but just 
differ on their status. Their theories are equally complex (Pautz 2010 and 2015: footnote 
31; Schaffer this volume?????).  
In short, nonidentity physicalism cannot achieve Smart’s simple dream picture any 
better than dualism. The nonidentity physicalist and dualist may have to share the same 
convoluted nightmare.  
 
4.2 An objection to equal complexity relying on general nonidentity physicalism 
I myself accept identity physicalism for all reality with the exception of conscious expe-
rience. But, for the sake of argument, suppose that the arguments from failure and from 
multiple realizability show that it also fails for consciousness-independent reality (Schaf-
fer 2013).  
In that case, in our world (unlike Lewis’s pixel world), there are various properties 
macro property P, Q, and so on that are distinct from any complex properties definable 
in terms of the fundamental base. Maybe they are being a mountain, being a city, being a 
hand, and so on. Or, maybe there are biconditional analyses of these properties in more 
fundamental terms (e. g. city in terms of building, hand in terms of finger), even if we 
cannot keep on going until we reach the fundamental base. In that case, P, Q, and so on 
are such more basic properties, but still at a “higher level” than the fundamental level.   
 In any case, besides psychophysical laws like the Color Law, the general noniden-
tity view requires countless extra-logical bridge laws operative in insentient reality, for 
instance: 
 
[P-Law] Necessarily, if the fundamental particles instantiate fundamental 
micro-physical and other properties A or B, then they instantiate macro 
property P (where P is not definable in terms of the fundamental base).  
 
                                               
14 See also Chalmers 2012: 341. For discussion of the kinds of problems that Adams brings up, see 
Pautz 2010 and 2019. Geoff Lee (in discussion and in his book MS) has pointed out to me that 
the Adams’ “arbitrariness” worry applies equally to physical laws. So psychophysical laws may not 
be worse off than physical laws.  
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[Q-Law] if the fundamental particles instantiate distribution of micro-phys-
ical properties C or D, then they instantiate macro property Q. 
 
Since nonidentity physicalists deny that macro property P is identical with the dis-
junction of A and B, the P-law isn’t is instance of the general claim “disjuncts ground 
disjunctions”. In general, the P-law cannot be derived from identifications and logic. It 
is a further, extra-logical law that is unique P. The same is true of the Q-law. For the 
sake of discussion, suppose that each is basic (but see footnote 21).  
Now here is an objection someone might make to my parity principle. The objec-
tion first asserts that grounding laws like the P-Law and the Q-law don’t add to the com-
plexity of our theory, because, even if P and Q are not identical with the microphysical 
distributions or functional properties definable in fundamental terms, they are in some 
obscure sense “nothing over and above” the fundamental microphysical distributions. 
This suggests that in general grounding laws don’t add to complexity. In that case, the 
hypothesis that the Color Law connecting brains states with states of acquaintance with 
Galilean colors is a grounding law is simpler than the hypothesis that it is a nomic law, 
giving us a reason to prefer it.15  
My reply is that the basic P-law and the basic Q-law would add to the complexity of 
our theory of the world. To see this, note that identity physicalists like Lewis and Sider 
do not have to accept them. In their view, our world is like the pixel world. There simply 
don’t exist such properties like P and Q that are not complex properties definable in terms 
of the fundamental base. Rather, all properties instantiated in our world are identical 
with such complex properties (including the ones expressed by “is a mountain”, “is 
hand”). Therefore, as we saw in §2.2, for identity physicalists the connection between 
the pattern of instantiation of the fundamental physical and topic-neutral properties and 
the pattern of the instantiation of all other properties is (broadly speaking) logical. By 
contrast, since nonidentity physicalists believe in properties like P and Q that aren’t de-
finable in terms of the fundamental base, general nonidentity physicalists need to accept 
additional, extra-logical “laws” which connect the pattern of instantiation of the funda-
mental physical and topic-neutral properties and the pattern of the instantiation of P 
and Q. How could this fail to add to the complexity of their theory? 16   
At this point the general nonidentity physicalist might agree that there is no simplic-
ity-based reason to think that Color Law is a grounding law rather than a nomic law, but 
suggest that, if in the rest of nature the grounding laws explain why macro properties like 
P and Q start to pop up when fundamental reality is arranged in complex ways, then 
                                               
15 Here I am indebted to Gabriel Rabin and Andrew Lee.   
 
16 As mentioned in §3.3, some nonidentity physicalists will say that the P-law is explained by the 
fact that it’s just in the “essence” of P to be grounded in microphysical distributions A or B. But 
this doesn’t enable them to avoid the charge of complexity. Since they are nonidentity physicalists 
who deny that P is simply identical with the disjunctive property A or B (they hold P is “irreduci-
ble”), their claim that it’s in the essence of P to be grounded in A or B is not an instance of the 
general claim that it is in the essence of a disjunctive property to be grounded in its disjuncts. 
They must take the P-law to be an additional essentialist truth that is special to P. And, as we shall 
see in 4.3, such additional “essentialist laws” would add to the complexity of their theory.  
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considerations of uniformity suggest that the Color Law, too, is a grounding law”. But 
this is different argument, and one I will return to in §5.  
 
4.3 Three additional objections to equal complexity 
The first objection additional objection I want to consider is based on essentialist noniden-
tity physicalism mentioned in §3.3. In particular, suppose that the Galilean nonidentity 
physicalist continues to hold that acquaintance with Galilean colors is very different 
from the underlying V4 brain states in the respects 1-4 listed at the start of §3. But 
suppose that she just invents an essentialist truth that is very different from standard 
essentialist truths (e. g. “it is in the essence of a disjunctive property that it is grounded 
in its disjuncts”). In particular, suppose that she declares that it simply flows from the 
(hidden) “constitutive essence” of acquaintance with Galilean colors that such acquaint-
ance is grounded in underlying V4 brain states in the systematic way specified by the 
Color Law. In that case, she might say, the Color Law “comes for free” and doesn’t add 
to the complexity of our theory. So perhaps we have a simplicity-based reason to prefer 
the speculative hypothesis that the Color Law has the status of an “essentialist law” (Fig-
ure 1b) over the dualist hypothesis that it is merely a contingent nomic law (Figure 1a).  
In reply, I stand by the parity principle. Consider again the story above about phi-
losopher A and philosopher B who know what the fundamental physical laws are gov-
erning our world, but disagree about their status. But now suppose that, while philoso-
pher A holds that the laws are primitive and contingent, philosopher B is a nomic essen-
tialist who holds that that it’s just a basic fact that they flow from the essences of the 
fundamental physical properties, even if this is not at all evident to us. They completely 
agree on what the laws are, but disagree about their status. We don’t have a simplicity-
based reason to prefer the philosopher B’s speculation about their status to philosopher 
A’s view about their status. Equally, don’t have a simplicity-based reason to prefer the 
speculative hypothesis that the Color Law has the status of an “essentialist law” (Figure 
1b) over the dualist hypothesis that it is merely a contingent nomic law (Figure 1a).  
Here is a second objection to my claim that any form of nonidentity physicalism is 
equally complex as its dualist counterpart due to David Chalmers (personal discussion). 
Chalmers (2010: chapter 12) is a Galilean intentionalist: our brains enable us to be con-
scious of uninstantiated Galilean colors and other sensible properties. Although he is 
sympathetic to Galilean dualism, he has also suggested (2015) a speculative a priori ver-
sion of Galilean nonidentity physicalism (“Russellian monism”). In one version of this 
view, if knew the “special quiddities” of the fundamental physical properties (position, 
energy, spin, particle number), we would see a priori that it’s metaphysically necessary 
that, if they are arranged so that someone undergoes V4 state B, then this grounds their 
being in the very different state of standing in the irreducible conscious-of relation to 
Galilean color f(B).17  The Color Law connecting distinct physical and experiential states 
                                               
17 This claim of a priori nonidentity physicalism that a physical-functional state a priori necessitates 
the very different state of being conscious of Galilean red is a bit like the claim that the state of 
action having the natural property of causing pain for the fun a priori necessitates the state of the 
action having the very different normative property ought-not-to-do-it-ness. I note in passing that 
a priori nonidentity physicalism is problematic. Whatever they may be, the microphysical “quid-
dities” presumably don’t include the Galilean quality red or the conscious-of relation (electrons 
aren’t red or conscious of one another). So how do their arrangements a priori entail that you are 
conscious-of the wholly novel Galilean quality red, which is not instantiated anywhere in reality? In 
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is not a priori for us now – it seems a posteriori and contingent. But, he suggests, the 
speculative hypothesis is that it is a priori is justified on the grounds that if such principles 
are a priori then they do not add to the complexity of our theory, no more than “if some-
thing is scarlet it is red”, “if x exists then the unit set [x] exists”, or “if Xs exist they 
compose something”. Thus a priori Galilean nonidentity physicalism is “more econom-
ical” than its dualist counterpart (2015: 269).  
In reply, I stand by the parity principle. Consider yet another twist on the debate 
between philosopher A and B on the status of the fundamental physical laws that govern 
the evolution of the universe. As before, philosopher A says the laws are contingent and 
a posteriori. But now suppose philosopher B is a rationalist who puts forward the specu-
lative claim that, if we only knew what the fundamental physical properties are like, then 
we would see a priori that the laws hold with metaphysical necessity (like the laws of 
“rational mechanics”). They agree on the laws, and just disagree on their status. I take 
it as obvious that their theories are equally complex. Complexity is matter of metaphys-
ics (what a theory says about the world), not epistemology (how we know it). So there is 
no simplicity-based reason to accept the a priority claim. 
In the same way, there is no simplicity-based reason to accept Chalmers’s specula-
tive hypothesis that the Color Law connecting brain states and distinct states of ac-
quaintance with Galilean colors (or some set of more basic underlying principles) is 
knowable a priori over the counterpart dualist hypothesis that the same Color Law (or 
the same set of more basic underlying principles) is only knowable a posteriori.18 And, 
even if principles like “if x exists then the unit set [x] exists” and “if Xs exist they compose 
something” enjoy some (nonconclusive) a priori support, they still add to complexity of 
our theory of the world (a theory that rejected sets and sums would be simpler). 
The third objection is that Galilean nonidentity physicalism looks just as complex as 
Galilean dualism only because it is so weird. What about a tamer version of nonidentity 
physicalism which holds that experiences are nonrelational “raw feel” states grounded 
in brain states, rather than mysterious intentional relations to uninstantiated Galilean 
properties? Won’t that seem simpler than dualism? 
My reply is that even such a tamer form of nonidentity physicalism must accept 
special systematic grounding laws (similar to the Color Law) that connect brain states 
with distinct experiential properties. So it is just as just a complex as its dualist counter-
part which holds that those same laws are contingent nomic laws.  
 
 
 
                                               
any case, if I am right, once we reject identity physicalism, we have no simplicity-based reason to 
accept such wildly speculative theories (“Russellian monism”, “pansychism”) over dualism.  
 
18 Philip Goff has suggested to me (in discussion) that, even if we have no simplicity-based reason 
to accept speculative hypothesis that the Color Law is an a priori necessity connecting distinct 
neural and experiential states rather than the dualist hypothesis that it is contingent and a posteriori, 
we do have a reason to accept this speculative hypothesis stemming from a “basic commitment to 
the world’s being intelligible”. But, as Fodor says in the quote from §1.1, since the fundamental 
laws of physics are brute and a posteriori, why can’t the Color Law have the same status? We may 
want everything to be a priori intelligible, but maybe the world just isn’t that way.  
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5. Is Nonidentity Physicalism More Uniform than Dualism? 
 
We are assuming that arguments from special nature show that, in connection with some 
(but not all) brain states, distinct conscious experiences emerge with the unique features 
1-4 listed at the start of §3. Our evidence only consists of regularities relating brain 
states and such distinct experiences. Given this limited evidence, how could we tell 
whether our brain states ground (zing) or merely lawfully determined (bling) our distinct 
experiences?  
In the previous section, we saw that simplicity considerations don’t help. In the pre-
sent section, I will look at another, more indirect argument. Maybe looking at the rest 
of nature will provide a clue. In particular, if we look at the rest of nature, we can perhaps 
argue on the basis of uniformity considerations for the hypothesis of nonidentity physical-
ism that our brain states ground our experiences over the hypothesis of dualism that they 
merely lawfully determine our experiences. Maybe the first hypothesis comes closer than 
the second to realizing the dream of a uniform account of reality.  
In §3.3, I distinguished between restricted and general nonidentity physicalism. We 
must consider them separately.  
  
5.1 Is Restricted Nonidentity Physicalism More Uniform Than Dualism? 
I myself am strongly committed to the identity physicalism of Lewis and Sider for all 
consciousness-independent reality. The insentient world resembles Lewis’s pixel world. 
Identity physicalism only fails in the special case of conscious experiences, and the only 
question is what to say about this case.  
Let me first briefly say why I think identity physicalism is superior to nonidentity 
physicalism for the all of insentient reality. Then I will consider whether, given this 
view, uniformity considerations might help with our question.  
When it comes to insentient reality, the main argument for nonidentity physicalism 
over identity physicalism concerns multiple realizability (Schaffer 2013). But in §2.3 we 
saw that this argument is weak. There are, on the other hand, arguments for identity 
physicalism mover nonidentity physicalism about insentient reality.  
First, the identity physicalism of Lewis and Sider was true at the moment of the big 
bang when the universe was very simple. And if identity physicalism was true for insen-
tient reality at time t, it is plausible that it is true for insentient reality at time t + 1. So 
it’s true for insentient reality at all later times as well, even when complex high-level 
properties (e. g. being a mountain) emerged that are hard to define in terms of the fun-
damental base. Analogy: if Lewis’s pixel world evolves according to laws in Conway’s 
famous Game of Life, then “identity pixelism” was true at every stage. Nonidentity phys-
icalists have to deny this. They must say that, even if identity physicalism was true at 
start, at a certain point novel properties (P, Q, etc.) started “popping up” that aren’t 
definable in terms of the fundamental base – an odd view.19  
                                               
19 Maybe nonidentity physicalists will respond that, even during the first moments after the big 
bang, nonidentity physicalism was false, because properties like being beautiful were instantiated 
that cannot be identified with complex properties defined in terms of the austere base, owing to 
their multiple realizability. But I think that being beautiful is a dispositional property defined in 
terms of the responses of sentient creatures. So we might revise the argument: all mind-independent 
properties instantiated in the universe in the initial moments were either properties in the austere 
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Second, as we saw in §4.2, nonidentity physicalism for insentient reality requires 
special, extra-logical “grounding laws”, like the P-law and the Q-law, that govern the 
emergence of the properties that aren’t definable in terms of the fundamental base. They 
add to the complexity of our theory. (And if they are declared to hold in virtue of the 
“essences” of the grounded properties, these special essentialist principles add to com-
plexity.) They also raise difficult questions. Schaffer (2020: sect. 1.3) says that he is after 
the simplest and most systematic basic grounding laws. But it’s very hard to believe that 
there is a systematic theory here. For instance, one grounding law is that, if the funda-
mental microphysical level is a certain way, then the property being a game is instantiated. 
Is there a unique set of more most basic grounding laws, starting from the microphysical 
base and moving up to higher and higher “levels”, that “chain together” to entail this 
law, so that it comes out as “derived” grounding law? It’s hard to believe that there is a 
systematic theory here, or even a fact of the matter as to what the “basic” grounding 
laws are. Another question is whether every miscellaneous disjunction of microphysical 
conditions grounds a property that is not a disjunction of those disjunctions or a func-
tional property constructible from the fundamental base that is realized by those dis-
juncts?20 Identity physicalism for insentient nature entirely avoids special “grounding 
laws” here, and so avoids all these problems (§4.2).21 
Let us, then, assume that identity physicalism is right for all of consciousness inde-
pendent reality, as I think it is. Arguments from special nature show that it is it fails only 
in one case: conscious experience. For instance, in color experience, we bear an irreduc-
ible conscious-of relation to Galilean colors. 
Given this, can we now appeal to uniformity considerations to argue that, in this 
special case, our distinct experiences are grounded in, rather than being lawfully deter-
mined by, more the fundamental facts? That is, can we use uniformity considerations to 
argue for restricted nonidentity physicalism over dualism. I think that the answer is no.  
                                               
base or complex properties definable in terms of them, and it is plausible that if this is true at time 
t then it is also true at time t + 1. The result is identity physicalism for consciousness-independent 
reality.  
 
20 David Lewis (as reported by Frank Jackson 1998: 127) has raised a similar question in connec-
tion with Moorean non-naturalism about normativity. 
 
21 General nonidentity physicalists might try to formulate a general, super maximalist theory of 
properties on which the distribution of fundamental properties and relations grounds a huge plen-
itude of properties, over and above the complex properties recognize by identity physicalists built 
from those fundamental properties and relations. For instance, such a theory might be strong 
enough to entail that, if something has the microphysical distribution of the Eiffel Tower or that 
of my nose, it thereby has property F, where F is not identical with the disjunction of these micro-
physical distributions, so that, in other worlds, F might be instantiated by virtue of alien properties 
or perhaps in a fundamental way. Thus F has microphysical sufficient conditions but no micro-
physical necessary conditions. But it’s not clear how such a super maximalist theory of properties 
could be formulated. One idea is that, for every logically consistent grounding profile, there is a 
property with that grounding profile. But this allow too much. It would entail that there is a 
property F that is grounded in the microphysical distribution of my nose and that in turn grounds 
the property of being one-hundred meters away from something with the microphysical distribu-
tion of the Eiffel Tower. And I can verify that there is no such property.  
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To see this, imagine the analogous situation in Lewis’s pixel world. Suppose as 
above that it evolves according to the rules of Conway’s Game of Life. And suppose that 
we are told that when certain special shapes occur (but not others) novel properties occur 
– E-properties – that are not definable in terms of pixels and their relations, and more-
over their occurrence seems to be governed by certain systematic bridge laws. The only 
thing we are in the dark about is whether they are extra-logical grounding laws (restricted 
nonidentity pixelism) or mere nomic laws (dualism).  
Here uniformity considerations cannot help us decide. True, the nomic law option 
requires that that are special nomic laws relating shapes and E-properties, quite different 
from Conway’s nomic laws that govern the evolution of the pixel world through time 
(nomological danglers). But the grounding option requires that there are special ground-
ing laws that kick in only when the right shapes occur in the pixel-world (grounding 
danglers). There are no other grounding laws like that – in fact, if identity physicalism 
is true for insentient reality, there are no interesting, extra-logical grounding laws at all 
in the rest of nature (except perhaps boring ones like parts ground wholes). These op-
tions provide equally non-uniform accounts of reality.  
Likewise, if assume that identity physicalism applies to all of consciousness-inde-
pendent reality, but that there are laws like the Color Law whereby some brain states 
(but not others) result in novel experiential properties, we cannot use uniformity con-
siderations to argue that those laws are grounding laws (restricted non-identity physi-
calism) rather than mere nomic laws (dualism). These options provide equally nonuni-
form accounts of reality. Both options imply the anomalism of the experiential.  
 
5.1 Is General Nonidentity Physicalism More Uniform Than Dualism? 
For the sake of argument, let us now assume, contrary to what I argued the previous 
section, that nonidentity physicalism is true for all of insentient reality, as Schaffer (2013, 
2017) has argued. That is, there are macro properties like P, Q, R . . . that are identical 
with complex properties definable in terms of the austere fundamental base. And there 
are special, extra-logical grounding laws like the following: 
 
[P-Law] Necessarily, if the fundamental particles instantiate distribution of 
micro-physical properties A or B, then they instantiate macro property P. 
 
[Q-Law] if the fundamental particles instantiate distribution of micro-phys-
ical properties C or D, then they instantiate macro property Q. 
 
In addition, let us assume that Galilean intentionalism is correct for sensory conscious-
ness. The only question is whether we should accept Galilean nonidentity physicalism or 
Galilean dualism.  
As we saw above, Galilean nonidentity physicalism and Galilean dualism only differ 
on the status of the following principle:  
 
Color Law: If the fundamental physical and topic-neural base properties are 
arranged so that a subject undergoes V4 brain state B, then they are in the 
distinct state of standing in the irreducible conscious-of relation to color f(B), 
where f is a systematic function from V4 brain states onto Galilean colors.  
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Galilean nonidentity physicalism holds that this law is a grounding law (Figure 1b) and 
Galilean dualism holds that it is a mere nomic law (Figure 1a). 
In the previous subsection, we saw that, if we accept identity physicalism for insentient 
reality, it is impossible to use uniformity considerations to argue that the Color Law is 
a grounding law rather than a synchronic nomic law.  
But you might think that, if we accept nonidentity physicalism for insentient reality, 
and so accept grounding laws like the P-law and the Q-law operative in the rest of na-
ture, we can use uniformity considerations to argue, in line with general nonidentity 
physicalism, that the Color Law should be just another grounding law (a point I alluded 
to at the end of §4.2).  
In addition, if the Color Law were a nomic law, it would be very different from 
other nomic laws in nature: Newton’s synchronic law of gravitation, Schrodinger’s dia-
chronic law governing the evolution of the wavefunction, and so on. Smart expressed 
this by saying that such special nomic laws, operative only in connection with brains of 
a certain complexity, would be “nomological danglers”, dangling from the rest of the 
body of nomic laws.22  
In more detail, the following points suggest that the Color Law is a grounding law 
(nonidentity physicalism) rather than a nomic law (dualism): 
 
1. The Color Law looks like the grounding laws that operate in insentient reality, such 
as P-law or the Q-law, in that it connects extremely complex, unnatural microphys-
ical conditions with the instantiation of macro properties.  
2. At the same time, the Color Law doesn’t look like standard nomic laws (e. g. New-
ton’s synchronic law of gravitation, Schrodinger’s law governing the evolution of 
the wavefunction), because standard nomic laws instead connect natural properties 
with other natural properties.  
3. The Color Law doesn’t look like a nomic law in another way. It connects a local 
state of the brain to distinct experiential states. By contrast, nomic laws connect the 
global state of the world to subsequent states.23   
 
Schaffer (2020) develops Smart’s “nomological danglers” objection to dualism. As 
we have seen, he instead favors a form of nonidentity physicalism on which the Color 
Law is a grounding law.  
However, the matter is not so clear-cut (as I have argued in Pautz 2004, 2010, 2015). 
The danglers objection cut both ways. It counts equally against the hypothesis that the 
Color Law is a grounding law. For even if general nonidentity physicalism is true and 
there are grounding laws (mereological laws, the P-law, the Q-law, etc.) operating in 
                                               
22 Feigl (1958) coined the term “nomological danglers”. I follow Feigl in using “nomological dan-
glers” to refer the relevant laws of emergence, rather than to emergent experiential states.  
 
23 To clarify, Smart’s argument is not the following: nomic laws necessarily relate natural properties 
and global states, but the Color Law doesn’t have these features, so it cannot be a nomic law. The 
argument is rather: in the actual world (not all worlds), nomic laws happen to have these character-
istics; since the Color Law doesn’t have these characteristics, it probably isn’t a nomic law.  
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insentient reality, the Color Law cannot be derived from them and indeed is very dif-
ferent from them. 24 So if it is a grounding law, it would be a strange “grounding dangler” 
that only kicks in when it comes to certain brain states. This weakens Scahffer’s infer-
ence to the conclusion “it’s just another grounding law”. In fact, in addition to looking 
very different from the grounding laws operative in the rest of nature, the Color Law in 
some ways resembles nomic laws.  
In more detail, the following points suggest that the Color Law is a nomic law (du-
alism) rather than a grounding law (nonidentity physicalism). 
 
1. The Color Law just doesn’t look like many grounding laws. Many rounding laws 
(e. g. mereological grounding laws) operate in nature generally. By contrast, the 
Color Law, and other psychophysical laws, only kick in in one place, namely brains 
of a certain complexity. 
2. The Color Law doesn’t look like grounding laws. By grounding laws, fundamental 
physical conditions ground boring properties (being a mountain, being a hand, be-
ing a game) that don’t turn ground anything else of interest (“grounding epiphe-
nomena”).25 By contrast, by psychophysical laws like the Color Law, brain states 
result in conscious experiences that are radically different (they have qualitative char-
acter, belong to novel standard out determinables, etc.) and that in turn ground 
much else (indeed, they are the source of all reasons for action and belief and per-
haps all value). 
3. In some ways, the Color Law and other psychophysical laws look more like nomic 
laws (e. g. Maxwell’s laws connecting electricity and magnetism) than the grounding 
laws that operate in the rest of nature. They are like nomic laws in that they system-
atic and relate very different states (brain states and acquaintance with Galilean colors, 
firing rates with pain intensities). In these respects, they are unlike interlevel 
grounding laws. For interlevel grounding laws are generally uncodifiable and messy 
(the “failure of conceptual analysis”), and the states that they result don’t radically 
differ in their natures from the underlying states (e. g. there being a mountain isn’t 
radically different from there being atoms arranged mountain-wise).26 
                                               
24 Nonidentity physicalists also could not derive the Color Law, and other psychophysical laws, 
from a general “super maximalist” theory of properties on which every condition specifiable in 
fundamental terms grounds a whole plentitude of properties that aren’t definable in fundamental 
terms (footnote 21). For we are assuming that the case for nonidentity physicalism in the first 
place is that conscious properties occur in connection with brains, but not other macro-level phys-
ical objects in nature (rocks and plants), that have special natures (e. g. features 1-4 listed at the start 
of §3). In fact, by the psychophysical laws, one brain state B might result in the distinct state of 
being acquainted with Galilean red, while another (unconscious) brain state B* results in nothing 
like this (assuming you don’t have a plenitude of experiences you aren’t aware of). Such discontin-
uous psychophysical laws that only kick in for certain brain states (but not others) could not be derived 
from any general theory of properties.   
 
25 It is true that the fact that something is a mountain entails the fact that it is massive. But it 
doesn’t ground that fact. The fact that something is a mountain doesn’t ground anything of interest. 
In this sense, being a mountain is a ground epiphenomenon.  
 
26 It might be replied that sometimes grounding laws are systematic. For instance, there is a 
grounding law whereby variations in the mean molecular kinetic energy of a gas systematically 
ground variations in the temperature of the gas. So maybe the Color Law is just another systematic 
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4. The psychophysical laws are discontinuous. They might map two broadly similar 
neural patterns onto incommensurable conscious experiences (acquaintance with 
Galilean red and acquaintance with Galilean pain), and a third onto no conscious ex-
perience at all. No grounding laws are like that. The fact that psychophysical laws 
are discontinuous makes them look more like contingent causal laws, because there 
is no problem with the idea that similar causes can have radically different effects. 
5. The distinction between nomic laws and grounding laws lines up with the distinc-
tion between the a posteriori and the a priori in the following sense: all nomic laws 
are a posteriori while all grounding laws (“if a and b exist, then the sum [a + b] exists”, 
“if particles are arranged mountain-wise there is a mountain”, and “if something is 
scarlet it is red”) at least enjoy some (nonconclusive) a priori support. Psychophysical 
laws like the grounding law fall on the a posteriori side of this line, suggesting that 
they are nomic laws rather than grounding laws. 27 
 
In sum, general nonidentity physicalism and dualism are equally nonuniform. Both 
agree that something very special happens in connection with some brain states that is 
radically different from what happens elsewhere in nature. True, dualism implies that 
psychophysical laws are nomological danglers (special nomic laws different from other 
contingent nomic laws), but general nonidentity physicalism implies that they are 
grounding danglers (special grounding laws totally different from other grounding laws, 
such as mereological grounding laws). In some ways, psychophysical laws resemble 
grounding laws. But they also have some earmarks of nomic laws.  
I conclude that nature just hasn’t left us with enough clues to determine whether 
psychophysical laws like the Color Law are grounding laws or nomic laws. Nonidentity 
physicalists like Johnston (1997, ms) and Schaffer (2020) think that they are grounding 
laws. Dualists think that they are nomic laws. I think that, once you look at the totality 
of evidence, it is just too close to call.  
 
6. Nonidentity Physicalism and Dualism on Mental Causation 
 
A big part of the physicalist dream is an account of mental causation compatible with 
causal closure. Is non-identity grounding physicalism better placed than dualism to ac-
commodate mental causation? I think that the answer is no. To illustrate, I will continue 
to work with Galilean dualism and Galilean nonidentity physicalism (Figure 1).  
                                               
grounding law, rather than a nomic law. My reply is that there is no such grounding law, because 
variations in the mean molecular kinetic energy of the gas just are variations in the temperature of 
that gas.  
 
27 Schaffer (2017) argues for a radical empiricist view on which grounding laws for concrete items 
are generally not a priori. But I think that he might have distinguished between conclusive and 
nonconclusive a priority (Pautz 2105: note 5). I think the lesson of Schaffer’s discussion is that 
grounding laws (e. g. “if there are atoms arranged mountain-wise there exists a mountain rather 
than a pink elephant”) are generally not conclusive a priori. But in my view they are generally non-
conclusive a priori (i. e. a priori plausible). By contrast, the Color Law (e. g. brain state B results in 
an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a pink and elephant-shaped thing) are deeply a 
posteriori, making them look more like nomic laws.    
 
                                                                     Rough draft. For G. Rabin Grounding and Consciousness (Oxford)                                                                                   
    
 30 
Start with Galilean nonidentity physicalism. Galilean nonidentity physicalists can 
accommodate mental causation by accepting a counterfactual analysis of causation.28 
You experience a red stop light, and press on the brakes. Had your brain state been 
different, your behavior would have been different. So your brain state causes your be-
havior. Your brain state also grounds your acquaintance with the Galilean red, in line 
with the Color Law. In evaluating similarity across worlds, we use a rather baroque sys-
tem of weights for different respects of comparison (Lewis 1979: 46 and Kment 2014: 
219). According to that system of weights, it is of the first importance to hold fixed the 
grounding (zinging) laws (such as the Color Law, on Galilean nonidentity physicalism) 
and of the second importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of the nomic 
laws. So it is also true that, had your experience been different, your brain state would 
have been different, so that behavior would have been different. Thus, on a counterfac-
tual analysis of causation, your experience as well as your brain state counts as a cause of 
your behavior. There is systematic overdetermination, but it is not troubling because it 
explained by the grounding laws. 
Next, Galilean dualism. It is just like dualism except that it holds that the color law 
is a nomic law. Now let us “define up” a new notion of counterfactual dependence, coun-
terfactual dependence*; and a new correlative notion of causation, causation*. As with coun-
terfactual dependence, we define counterfactual dependence* in terms of similarity of 
worlds. But we define it using a slightly different baroque system of weights. In fact, we 
treat psychophysical nomic (bling) laws, such as the Color Law, in the same way we treat 
grounding (zing) laws. That is to say, it is of the first importance to hold fixed the 
grounding laws and the psychophysical laws. (In §3.4, we noted that nonidentity physi-
calist most hold that the weightings are somewhat conventional; this is just a different 
convention.) Using system of weights, it follows analytically from dualism that your be-
havior counterfactually depends* on your acquaintance with red as well counterfactually 
depending* on your brain state. (By contrast, by the standard system of weights, your 
behavior doesn’t counterfactually depend on your acquaintance with red: see Loewer 
61.) So both are causes* of your behavior. 29 There is systematic overdetermination*, but 
it is not troubling because it explained by the nomic laws.  
Now you cannot directly tell by introspection that your experience of red causes 
rather than causes* your behavior. After all, causation and causation* do not significantly 
differ. Compare: you cannot tell by perception whether there is a table there or there is* a 
table there, where the former requires a composite object while the letter only requires 
atoms arranged table-wise. So there is no direct argument, based on considerations of 
mental causation, for Galilean nonidentity physicalism over Galilean dualism. Of 
course, we do have a different reason to reject a Galilean dualist view on which our 
                                               
28 See Loewer 2017 for how nonidentity physicalists can accommodate mental causation. Hall 
(2005: 518) argues persuasively that nonidentity physicalists cannot take causation to be primitive 
on the grounds that this would make it “a complete mystery why there should be any relations 
whatsoever of metaphysical dependence between the patterns of instantiation of causation at dif-
ferent levels”. 
 
29  In saying that your experience is a cause* of your behavior, I’m not assuming that causation* 
falls under our concept “causation”. In fact, as I am about to point out, this issue is not at all 
important.  
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experiences of Galilean colors cause* our behaviors: it is complicated. But in §4 we saw 
that the Galilean nonidentity physicalism is equally complicated.30 
  
7.  A General Skeptical Challenge for Ground Enthusiasts?  
 
We have assumed that the identity physicalism of Lewis and Sider fails, and we have 
been looking at whether the fallback position of nonidentity physicalism might achieve 
the physicalist dream. On this view, the following law is a “grounding” law rather than 
a nomic law:  
 
Color Law: If a subject undergoes V4 brain state B, then they are in the dis-
tinct state of standing in the irreducible conscious-of relation to color f(B) 
 
I have argued for the skeptical view that, once we give up identity physicalism, we have 
no good reason to think that our brain states ground (zing) distinct experiences, rather 
than merely nomically determining (blinging) them. It doesn’t achieve the physicalist 
dream. The grounding option is not simpler than the nomic option. Abductive meth-
odology cannot help us decide between them. 
I now want to argue that, if we recognize an indefinable “grounding” connection in 
addition to nomic determination, the skeptical problem can be generalized. I will illus-
trate the general problem with two examples (Pautz 2015). 
The first example is this:    
 
Newton’s laws: if bodies have masses m and m* and are separated by distance 
d then, they are stand in force relation f(m, m*, d), where f is given by the 
inverse square law.  
 
Now imagine a dispute between philosopher A and philosopher B. Philosopher A 
takes the standard view that Newton’s law is a nomic law. Philosopher B is a maverick 
who takes it to be a grounding law: the masses of bodies together with their distances 
systematically ground the force relations holding between them.  
You might think that the view of philosopher B is absurd because Newton’s law is 
a posteriori while grounding connections are generally a priori. But nonidentity physical-
ists like Schaffer cannot so quickly dismiss the maverick hypothesis. After all, Schaffer 
holds that the Color Law is a grounding law between distinct states, even though he also 
thinks it is deeply a posteriori. So he cannot dismiss out of hand the hypothesis that the 
same is true of Newton’s Law. I think Schaffer may be right to hold that, if grounding 
is an indefinable worldly connection alongside nomic determination, there is no reason 
why grounding connections cannot be a posteriori in this way (§3.1). 31   
                                               
30 In my view, then, despite the enormous popularity of the causal argument against dualism, it 
contributes nothing beyond the simplicity argument. This seems to have been Smart’s view as 
well (1959: 156). I do think that dualism is open to a different problem about luck but I think that 
nonidentity physicalism faces the same problem (Pautz 2020).       
 
31 By the way, because he is an empiricist about all grounding connections (with the exception of 
those of logic and mathematics), Schaffer (2017) also faces the reverse question: what reason have 
we to think standard “grounding” connections in nature are indeed grounding connections rather 
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Nor can we decide the dispute between philosophers A and B by using abductive 
methodology. Both hypotheses are equally explanatorily virtuous. They both avoid the 
idea that the regularity is a cosmic coincidence. There is also no difference between 
them on the score of simplicity.  
Here is another example. Suppose that in the limit of theorizing we all agree to:  
 
Dynamic law: if the state of the world at time t is s, then the state of the world 
at time t + n is f(s).  
 
Philosopher A holds that this is a nomic law. Philosopher B is a maverick who holds 
that this is a grounding law. Only the initial state of the universe is fundamental. Every 
future state is grounded. Whatever features you think are essential to grounding, phi-
losopher B says that they are present in this case. So if you think grounding must be 
deterministic and well-founded, philosopher B says that the relation between the state 
of the world at different times is deterministic and that the universe must have a begin-
ning!32   
I think that this new skeptical challenge cannot be answered. If you recognize two 
worldly secret connections out there in the world, nomically determining and ground-
ing, it would be absurd to say that we have non-inferential a priori reason to think that 
Newton’s law and the dynamic law are nomic laws rather than grounding laws - that this 
is just an “intrinsically plausible” starting point. So if we have a reason, it must be infer-
ential. In that case, there must be some completion of the following. 
 
Our inferential reason to believe that Newton’s law and the dynamic law are 
nomic rather than grounding laws is _________. 
 
But I don’t see what could fill the blank here.33  
Now, at this point, I face a tu quoque. After all, for the purposes of making sense of 
the difference between dualism and nonidentity physicalism, I recognized a notion of 
                                               
than mere nomic connections (Pautz 2015: footnote 5)? For instance, maybe the fact that the 
matter of the cheese is arranged a certain way only lawfully determines (rather than grounds) the 
fact that there exist many immaterial holes in it. On this view, in some metaphysically possible 
worlds the cheese is the same but holes (understood as irreducible immaterial objects) don’t exist. 
Abductive methodology (e. g. the appeal to simplicity) doesn’t discriminate between these options.  
      
32 I use the dynamic law example to illustrate my skeptical challenge in Pautz (2015: footnote 5). 
Rabin (2019: 197) poses a related but different challenge philosophers like Schaffer who think that 
grounding connections can be a posteriori. How can they rule out the maverick claim that every-
thing is a posteriori grounded in the state of a single peanut? Schaffer (2020: footnote 15) replies 
that this explanatory claim is not fruitful, so that no one would accept it. My challenge is different. 
I focus on cases, such as Newton’s Law and the fundamental dynamic laws, where everyone already 
agrees that it is explanatorily fruitful to think that there is some kind of explanatory connection in 
nature. And my skeptical challenge is: why believe that the explanation connection is one of nomic 
determination rather than one of grounding? Here both hypotheses are equally explanatory fruitful 
in that they both explain the agreed upon regularities rather than taking them to cosmic coinci-
dences.  
 
33 Schaffer (in discussion) mentioned appealing to paradigm cases or reflective equilibrium.  
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nomic determination and a “stronger” indefinable connection of grounding (Figure 1). 
So I also face the question: why believe that Newton’s law and the dynamic law are 
nomic rather than grounding laws?   
My answer is that, although I assumed for the sake of formulating nonidentity phys-
icalism that there is an indefinable worldly connection of grounding in addition to nomic 
determination, I do not think that there is such a thing. I recognize connections flowing 
from identifications (Dorr 2016). And I recognize conceptual connections (Chalmers 
2010: 184ff and 2012: 453). But I do not recognize an indefinable connection of ground-
ing detached from these things. So I can rule out the maverick hypothesis that Newton’s 
law and the dynamic law are “grounding” (or “zinging”) laws by saying that I don’t un-
derstand it. My case against indefinable grounding is that it opens up bizarre skeptical 
possibilities (e. g. that Newton’s law and the dynamic law are “grounding laws”) that we 
don’t have a grip on. In addition, we can achieve a more parsimonious account of the 
world without it (compare Sider 2011: sect. 12.1).34 
This means that, even though I have played along for the sake of argument, I also 
not grip on nonidentity physicalism when it is formulated in terms of such an indefinable 
connection of grounding.  
I’m also skeptical about the indefinable locution “it is in the essence of X that p” 
(Fine 1994) as well as a primitive notion of metaphysical necessity or possibility (as dis-
cussed by Chalmers 2010: 189). So in the end I think it is hard to make sense of the 
difference between nonidentity physicalism and a counterpart dualist view.  
Therefore, I would put the moral of my discussion of nonidentity physicalism in 
this way: if we can somehow understand the view that experiences are distinct from (and 
perhaps very different from) underlying physical-functional states but there are “meta-
physically necessary” interlevel laws connecting them, then there is no reason to prefer 
this view to a counterpart dualist view on which those interlevel laws are merely “nomi-
cally necessary”.35   
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Physicalists claim that conscious experiences are “metaphysically necessitated by” the 
distribution of fundamental physical and topic-neutral properties and relations. Why 
believe this incredible modal claim?36 I have argued for three claims.  
                                               
34 For other reasons to be skeptical about an indefinable grounding connection (e. g. involving 
whether there is a unified concept here), see Wilson 2014.  
 
35 In this essay, I have been assuming an “inflationary”, anti-Humean account of metaphysical 
necessity in the sense of Sider 2011: chap. 12. Sider himself defends a “deflationary”, Humean 
account of metaphysical necessity. The metaphysical necessities are what follow from the “modal 
axioms”. The “modal axioms” are given by a mere list and have nothing interesting in common; 
there is a sense in which the list is up to us and not the world. If this view is right, then it is even 
more obvious that there is no reason to prefer nonidentity physicalism to a counterpart dualist 
view. It’s just a matter of whether the inter-level “laws” (which on this view are just summaries of 
inter-level regularities) connecting the physical and the experiential are on “the list”. The issue is 
totally non-substantive and may be indeterminate.  
 
36 Even those who are open to the view that the fundamental physical properties are little “quid-
dities” or “feelings” face this question.  
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First, the only route to establishing physicalism is justification by identification. Identity 
physicalism (Lewis, Sider, Dorr) holds that conscious experiences are identical with 
hugely complex properties defined in terms of the austere fundamental base. It can be 
justified by an inference to the best explanation because it achieves the physicalist dream 
of a maximally simple and uniform view of reality. And it entails the incredible modal 
claim.  
Second, once we reject identity physicalism because of arguments from the special 
nature of consciousness, we might fall back to nonidentity physicalism (Campbell, John-
ston and Shaffer). On this view, even though experiences are distinct from (and indeed 
very different from) all complex properties definable in terms of the austere fundamental 
case, there are “metaphysically necessary”, extra-logical bridge laws connecting them 
with such complex properties. But there is no strong argument for preferring noniden-
tity physicalism to a counterpart dualist view on which those bridges laws are merely 
contingent. It provides an equally complex and unattractive pictures of nature. It doesn’t 
achieve the physicalist dream.   
Third, since these views are so similar, we also should not much care about the debate 
between nonidentity physicalism and its dualist counterpart.   
The upshot is that, when it comes to the metaphysics of consciousness, the “big 
divide” is between identity physicalism and all the rest. This is where the debate should 
focus.  
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